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U. S. PROPOSES ALLIED ADVISORY COUNCIL ON JAPAN

THE problem of establishing effective machinery for Allied consultation on policy toward Japan has been brought to the fore by Secretary Byrnes' invitation of October 9, asking nine other governments to join in creating a Far Eastern Advisory Commission. In naming Major General Frank Ross McCoy, President of the Foreign Policy Association, as the American member, the Secretary of State has chosen a representative with long and varied experience both in the Far East and in the general field of international affairs. General McCoy was in charge of American relief activities in Japan after the Tokyo earthquake of 1923 and later served as the American member of the Lytton Commission appointed by the League of Nations in 1931 to study the Manchurian situation. During World War II he served on the Roberts Commission to investigate the disaster at Pearl Harbor, and headed the military commission which tried eight Nazi saboteurs in the summer of 1942.

THE COMMISSION'S POWERS. Under the terms laid down by the United States, the Far Eastern Advisory Commission is to make recommendations to the participating governments on the "policies, principles and standards" needed to determine Japan's fulfillment of its surrender obligations; on the measures and machinery required for Japan's strict compliance with the surrender terms; and on such other matters as are assigned to it. The Commission is specifically excluded from considering military operations or territorial adjustments. Its headquarters are to be in Washington, but it may meet elsewhere as required. The nations invited by the United States include China, the Soviet Union, Britain, France, the Netherlands, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the Philippines. At the request of the British, India may be added to the list.

The main features of the proposed Commission are

these: it is to be purely advisory and will not possess powers of control; General MacArthur is not to be subject to its direct influence, since its recommendations will be made to the participating governments; and, because of its size and constitution, the influence of any great power will depend in large part on its ability to win the support of the smaller members. The idea of the Commission is not a new development in American policy; rather it reaffirms the general position taken by this country during the past two months. In the latter part of August, shortly after the Japanese surrender, Secretary Byrnes invited Britain, the Soviet Union and China to join in creating an advisory body. The Chinese and Russians accepted, but no British decision was reached until Foreign Secretary Bevin examined the question personally with the Secretary of State at the London Council of Foreign Ministers.

JAPAN DISCUSSED AT LONDON. The British, who showed some interest in creating a control body rather than an advisory one, wanted the commission to meet in Tokyo, and asked that India be included. Then, on September 25, perhaps influenced partly by the possibility of British support, Foreign Commissar Molotov asked for the establishment of an Allied control commission for Japan. Although this request was characterized in some press reports as a "bomb," Molotov's statement was a reasonably worded expression of the Russian point of view. It was, however, outside the conference agenda and went counter to the American position which had already been outlined in a White House declaration of September 22 in the following terms: "Although every effort will be made, by consultation and by constitution of appropriate advisory bodies, to establish policies for the conduct of the occupation and the control of Japan which will satisfy the principal Allied Powers, in the event of any differences of

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opinion among them, the policies of the United States will govern."

The question of Japan was not considered at the formal meetings of the Foreign Ministers, but was discussed vigorously outside the regular sessions. As a result, Mr. Byrnes announced on September 29 that Britain had given its consent to the proposal made by the United States in August "for the establishment of a Far Eastern Commission to formulate a policy of carrying out the Japanese terms." That this was to be an advisory body was indicated by the statement that "the commission will also be asked to consider whether a control council should be established and, if so, the power which should be vested in it." But there was no doubt that the United States did not itself favor the idea of inter-Allied control.

On October 10 Mr. Byrnes underlined the American position when he told the press that he did not believe the proposal for a control commission was a wise one. He expressed the opinion that we had promised to administer Japan through the issuance of directives to the Emperor by General MacArthur and that, if the basis of control were changed, we would be violating our word to the Japanese. It is also understood that General MacArthur would be strongly opposed to the establishment of international controls over his policies in Japan, although he has made no public statement on the issue.

U.S. NEEDS AID OF ALLIED PERSONNEL. As the Supreme Commander announced on October 15, the armed forces throughout Japan have been entirely demobilized. In recent weeks he has also ordered a series of economic, social and political reforms. But because some of our instructions have

been far-reaching in scope, it is doubtful whether the United States possesses sufficient military or technical personnel in Japan to insure their full execution. Our occupation of Japan is only a partial one, we are intent on reducing our troops there, and few Americans are available who are familiar with Japan or the Japanese language. We are, it is true, still operating under the handicap of having received the Japanese surrender much earlier than expected, but it seems likely that even when we have reached our maximum technical force and have ironed out difficulties in organization, the need for a larger administrative staff will remain if the goals we have announced are to be achieved.

This suggests the desirability of securing additional personnel from Allied countries—particularly China, Britain and Russia—as well as the importance of other nations sending troops to Japan to supplement our own. That the latter question has been discussed for some time was revealed on October 13 by an American military spokesman in Tokyo. He declared on the following day that General MacArthur would announce shortly the Russian, British and Chinese areas of occupation, and indicated that the first forces would be of a token character. It seems likely that when Allied forces enter Japan, they will automatically be accompanied by a certain number of administrators. But cooperation in both the technical and military fields will be influenced, or even determined, by whether the Big Four can agree on the procedure for handling Japan. This is one reason why the reaction of Russia, Britain and China to the American proposals of October 9 is a matter of considerable importance. **LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER**

COST OF VICTORY COMPELS ALLIES TO MAINTAIN WARTIME UNITY

LONDON, OCT. 13.—Here at this outpost of war, which has become the world's best watchtower for signs of approaching storms, harrowing questions about the future press on one from all sides as reports multiply concerning the hatred and brutality left on the continent in the wake of Germany's defeat. People ask themselves in bewilderment what the war was fought for. The answer for England is plain: the war was fought for national survival. But even here, where material and moral conditions are immeasurably superior to those on the continent, mere survival will not be enough if post-war existence proves intolerably harsh and insecure. And personal survival itself seems beyond justification: why are you and I alive today while others—gifted, cherished, irreplaceable—are gone? This chance opportunity to keep on living seems justifiable only if we take advantage of it to make existence liveable for others.

What was shocking about the fiasco of the first Council of Foreign Ministers was not that final de-

cisions on controversial issues were not reached, or that the conferees became deadlocked on questions of procedure, but that few of them—so far as can be ascertained—acted as if the welfare of millions of human beings, already harried and terrorized by war beyond the point of endurance, hung on the outcome of their negotiations. The imagination, the courage, the willingness to experiment and take risks, which Allied war leaders displayed on the battlefield and in laboratories at work on the atomic bomb, seem absent from the discussions that "the lazy men of peace"—to use Sheridan's phrase in *The Rivals*—have been conducting in Washington and London.

Admittedly, the problems of the peace settlement are numerous and baffling. We did not need to wait for the atomic bomb to fragment the world. It had long been in the process of being blown into bits by social and economic convulsions, by old apprehensive nationalisms in Europe and new aggressive nationalisms in Asia and the Middle East. How to reassemble these fragments into a workable whole is the task

we have barely begun to face. Once more the time differential in the development of nations impedes settlement on a basis of equality. Britain, which in 1919 accepted the principle of international organization then unacceptable to the United States, has had time during the past quarter of a century to become disillusioned with the practical application of this principle to problems of military security and economic well-being. Once a free-trade country, it turned to the sterling bloc and empire preferences as an offset to our high tariffs, just at the time when the United States—suddenly becoming aware of the need for export markets as outlets for our greatly increased industrial production—wants to trade freely everywhere, yet without reducing tariffs below the limited point permitted by the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act.

Britain needs our economic assistance, but it does not ask for charity. It asks for freedom to sell in our markets so that it can buy from us: exactly what we insist on for ourselves in markets now dominated by Britain. It is idle for us to expect that we can coerce Britain into a trade program we consider desirable. A people who withstood without flinching the worst of Hitler's onslaughts are not going to yield to economic threats from Washington. The United States, 25 years after Britain, accepted the principle of international organization when the Senate ratified the San Francisco Charter by an overwhelming majority. But are we ready to apply this principle in practical matters like trade and financial relations with Britain?

How can we denounce Russia for what we call its narrow nationalism, in Eastern Europe or elsewhere, when we ourselves tend to consider only our own interests? Why don't we put the Russians to shame by being better, more generous, more far-sighted than we claim they are? Russia, in turn, has reached a stage of nationalism that Britain and the United States, newly won to the idea of international organizations and consultation with smaller countries, believe they have left far behind. The very same

critics in Western countries, who used to be disturbed by the international aspirations of the Soviet régime in the days of Lenin and Trotsky, are now equally alarmed because Russia is acting like an old-fashioned national state—showing the same interest in the Dardanelles and Port Arthur as the Tsars did.

The victory of the Labor party has introduced a new element into the Big-Three negotiations which promises to have far-reaching effects. From the point of view of the British, Foreign Secretary Bevin can talk just as bluntly as he wants to the Russians (and he did at the Council of Foreign Ministers) because, unlike some Conservatives, he cannot be accused of harboring old-time hostility toward the Soviet government. Under Bevin, therefore, Britain may be expected to take a tougher line toward Russia than it did under the suave leadership of Eden, and to do so with widespread public support. The Russians for their part, although never at ease with Churchill, sense in the Labor government quite correctly a serious competitor for leadership of Leftist elements on the continent.

Whatever else may happen, these new circumstances will probably result in franker, if less outwardly smooth, discussions than those of Teheran and Yalta. But no one who has seen the destruction and suffering wreaked by war—and the Russians have seen more than the British, let alone the Americans—can believe that these negotiations will prove vain. Humanity has a tenacity in clinging to life and hope which is truly heartrending. Flowers sprout among the ruins of London in the shadow of St. Paul's. Children bloom among their elders, whose faces are drawn by privations and anxiety. Love defies war's bestiality. Men and women crave peace and the opportunity to share family life with the same intensity with which they crave food. Their wants are so small, their sufferings are so great. If Allied political leaders disregard these wants and sufferings, they will be held ultimately no less criminal than the Axis war criminals we are about to put on trial.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

COLONIAL REVOLTS FLARE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

Thrown into sharp relief as one of the central problems left in the wake of the war is the colonial dilemma in Southeastern Asia where, with Japanese rule ended, the French, Dutch and British now find their own supremacy under fire. "Down with French Imperialism" and "Death to French Domination" are the slogans of the Annamite nationalists of Indo-China, while Indonesian leaders in Java have proclaimed they would rather "live in hell" than submit to Dutch rule again. Overshadowed by this agitation is the situation in Malaya, where rioting natives are reported to have demanded independence from the

British. The bloodiest conflict is in Indo-China, with about a thousand casualties reported to date, although the commander of the "Indonesian People's Army," according to a Netherlands news agency report, declared war on the Dutch on October 13—a guerrilla war in which the weapons are proclaimed to be "all kinds of fire-arms, also poison, poisoned darts and arrows, all methods of arson and any kind of wild animals, as for instance snakes."

French circles have claimed that the Viet Nam, a nationalist organization, represents not more than 10 per cent of the Annamite population, but revolu-

tions are made by small, disciplined and determined minorities. Crowded into the densely populated coastal plains of Tonkin, Annam and Cochin China, the Annamites, two million of whom are reported to have starved because of recent crop failures, make up 72 per cent of Indo-China's 23 million. The Dutch East Indies, with perhaps 70 million inhabitants, is also suffering from a rice shortage. However, revolutionaries must have armed strength and the question is whether poison and snakes can be supplemented by enough guns to fight off the French and Dutch, who are sending in warships with troops.

JAPANESE BLAMED. Both the French and Dutch have tried to lay the blame for the uprisings on the Japanese. The French maintain the Viet Nam is made up of Annamites who collaborated with the Japanese, and who today hope to hide their fascist past by including Communist leaders in their membership. This charge is echoed by the Dutch, who declare the Indonesian rebellion to be the work of a small band of terrorists headed by a Japanese puppet. Although there may be some truth in both these charges, the significant fact is that educated natives, like many of the Annamites of Indo-China, proud of a long and rich history and culture of their own, have been agitating for years. Hopeful that an aroused world opinion will lend new force to their claims, they are taking advantage of French and Dutch weakness to push their cause to the limit.

Exasperated by the Indo-Chinese refusal to accept assurances of greater autonomy in a Federal Union, the French are determined to hold their own. The problems of Indo-China are so tremendous that outside aid will be needed for a long time to come, and the French feel it only proper they should continue the work already begun. In keeping with this view, they have adopted a plan to spend several hundred million dollars to rehabilitate Indo-China within the next year, and nearly 35,000 tons of merchandise are already on the way to Saigon. It is not surprising, therefore, that peace negotiations between French representatives and Annamite leaders are so difficult.

Like the French, the Dutch have made rather general promises of self-government for their possessions, but the nationalists want action now. The Dutch, however, have so far refused to negotiate with the present Indonesian leader, Soekarno, on the ground that he collaborated with the Japanese. Meanwhile, Japanese troops, under British orders, attempt to restrain the rebels. This puzzling use of Japanese troops is to be explained by the fact that their forces

still so far outnumber Allied soldiers in Java and Indo-China that they are being employed as a matter of military expediency.

IMPERIAL RIVALRIES. The British role has been a source of irritation to both the French and Dutch, for British commanders in Indo-China and Java have tried to bring the French and Dutch representatives into negotiations with rebel leaders. In Indo-China the French are confronted with an Allied decision to divide the country into a northern sphere under Chinese jurisdiction, and a southern sphere under the British, until the Japanese are out and the French in a position to take over again. Arrangements are now being made by the respective governments to recognize French civil administration during the temporary British and Chinese military occupation. The British and Chinese positions, although correct, may have the same effect of undermining French prestige that British policy did in Syria and Lebanon. The Annamites, incidentally, claim they have Chinese support in their struggle for independence, although Chiang Kai-shek has declared Chinese troops would neither encourage the independence movement nor help the French suppress it.

Malayan agitation for independence is much less strenuous than that of the Annamites or Indonesians, but the British have announced that a new constitutional status will be granted to British Malaya. What this will mean to the people is not yet clear. The British plan is to combine the Malay States and the Straits Settlements into a "Malayan Union" with a new Malayan citizenship, while making Singapore into an entirely separate colony.

What will be the future of these colonial peoples? Their moral rights are undeniable. Yet to the powers security and economic interests dictate that they must remain in the Far East. Such a dilemma can hardly be solved other than by compromise. The wisest policy for the European powers seems to be one of making generous concessions.

VERNON MCKAY

NEW RESEARCH STAFF MEMBER

The Association announces with pleasure the appointment to the Research Department of Vernon McKay. Mr. McKay received his Ph.D. from Cornell University; studied at the School of International Studies in Geneva; and for the past nine years has taught history at Syracuse University. The author of several articles on French colonial policy, Mr. McKay, as a member of the F.P.A. staff, will concentrate on colonial affairs and the problems of dependent peoples.

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